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A key parameter in economics is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), which 
measures the extent to which consumers shift total expenditures across time in response 
to changes in the effective rate of return.  In contrast to the previous literature, which 
primarily has relied on Euler equation methods and generated a wide range of estimates, 
we show how a life-cycle-consistent econometric specification of employee 401(k) 
participation along with plausibly exogenous variation in rates of return due to employer 
matching contributions can be used to generate new estimates of the EIS.  Because firms 
often cap the generosity of the match, employer matching generates non-linearities in 
household budget sets.  We draw on non-linear budget-set estimation methods rooted in 
the public economics literature, and using detailed administrative contribution, earnings, 
and pension-plan data for a sample of 401(k)-eligible households from the Health and 
Retirement Study, we estimate the EIS to be   in our richest specification, with a 95% 
confidence interval that ranges from   to  . 
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A key parameter in economics is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), 
which measures the extent to which consumers shift total expenditures across time in 
response to changes in the effective rate of return.  The EIS plays a central role in studies 
of consumption and asset pricing, as well as the positive and normative analyses of the 
impact of taxation on saving behavior.  Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on this 
elasticity, much of which has relied on Euler-equation studies of consumption, is mixed 
(Browning and Lusardi, 1996).  For example, the well-known papers by Hall (1988) and 
Dynan (1993) suggest point estimates of the EIS for the United States that are small or 
close to zero, while others find larger point estimates: Skinner (1985), from 0.3 to 0.5; 
Blundell, Meghir, and Neves (1993), 0.5; Attanasio and Weber (1995), from   to  ; 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), from   to 1; Ziliak and Kniesner (2005), from 0.7 to 1; and 
Mulligan (2002), Gruber (2006), and Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003), from 1 to 
2, among others.   
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Although some of the differences across studies likely can be linked to differences 
in the type of data used (aggregate time-series, cohort, or household-level), the 
specification of preferences and heterogeneity, the treatment of limited asset-market 
participation, and taxation, one important concern with many existing studies is that there 
is rather limited independent variation in rates of return with which to identify estimates 
of the EIS.
1  For example, the EIS in Euler-equation studies often is identified primarily 
by time-series variation in interest rates, but the underlying economic factors that move 
                                                 
1 For analyses of the sensitivity of estimates to the type of data used, see Attanasio and Weber (1993, 
1995);  the specification of preferences and heterogeneity, see Attanasio and Weber (1989) and Attanasio 
and Browning (1995); the treatment of limited asset-market participation, see Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner 
(2002), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), and Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003);  taxation, see Mulligan 
(2002), Gruber (2006), Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003) and Ziliak and Kniesner (2005). 
  2interest rates may also affect consumption decisions.  The usefulness of instrumental-
variable (IV) techniques that attempt to circumvent this difficulty by drawing on lagged 
values of the interest rate from the information set may be limited if shocks to capital 
markets are persistent, but slow moving (Gruber, 2006).
2  Carroll (2001), Ludvigson and 
Paxson (2001), and Yogo (2004) discuss more general problems with Euler-equation 
estimation. 
In contrast to the existing literature, we take a novel approach and show how a 
detailed life-cycle-consistent econometric specification of employee 401(k) participation 
can be used to generate new estimates of the EIS.  The key to our approach is that many 
employers that sponsor 401(k) plans also match employee contributions.  A typical match 
might be 50 cents for each dollar of contribution, up to a maximum percentage of pay, 
say, 6 percent.  Because there is substantial variation across firms in matching schemes, 
as we document in the analysis below, employer matching provides large, plausibly 
exogenous cross-sectional variation in the effective rate of return that can be used to 
identify the EIS.     
  We begin by using the necessary conditions for optimal tax-deferred saving to 
derive a life-cycle-consistent econometric specification for 401(k) participation.  Because 
firms often cap the generosity of the match, employer matching generates non-linearities 
in household budget sets.  We draw on non-linear budget-set estimation methods rooted 
in the public economics literature and applied in a companion paper, Engelhardt and 
Kumar (forthcoming), and apply them to a sample of 1,042 individuals in 1991 eligible 
for 401(k) plans in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  To circumvent difficulties 
with measurement error in 401(k) participation and matching incentives, we use 
                                                 
2 Gruber (2006) discusses these issues of identification in detail.  
  3administrative data from three sources: contributions from W-2 earnings records provided 
by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS); 
detailed matching formulas from pension Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) provided by 
the employers of HRS respondents; and, a combination of Social-Security-covered-
earnings histories for 1951-1991 and W-2 earnings for 1980-1991, pension SPDs, and 
pension-benefit calculators to measure lifetime earnings that are used to construct key 
variables in our empirical specifications.   
  Our estimates from the life-cycle-consistent discrete choice regression 
specifications for 401(k) participation indicate an EIS of   for our richest 
specification.  The 95% confidence interval ranges from   to  , so that, at 
conventional significance levels, we can reject the null hypothesis that the EIS is zero, but 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the EIS is 1, the latter of which is associated with 
log utility.   
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Although based on a fundamentally different approach than in the existing 
literature and a sample limited to older workers eligible for a 401(k), our results are 
generally consistent with the recent Euler-equation estimates of the EIS of Attanasio and 
Weber (1995) and Ziliak and Kniesner (2005).  Because many workers with 401(k)s 
invest in equities in their accounts, our results are also consistent with the findings of 
Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), and Vissing-Jorgensen 
and Attanasio (2003) that the EIS for stockholders is high.  In addition, those studies 
treated asset ownership as exogenous, whereas our estimate of the EIS comes from the 
estimation of the decision to own tax-deferred assets itself.  Finally, our results are 
  4substantially larger than the highly-cited experimental findings from the HRS of Barsky, 
Kimball, Juster, and Shapiro (1997), who estimated an EIS of 0.18.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Because our approach relies on employer 
matching as the basis for identification, we begin by describing our data and the variation 
in employer matching schemes in section 2.   In section 3, we lay out a detailed 
theoretical framework that models the budget set defined by employer matching and the 
tax treatment of 401(k) saving as twice continuously differentiable and derive the first-
order conditions from the consumer’s optimization.  Then in section 4, we use these 
conditions to derive a life-cycle-consistent econometric specification for 401(k) 
participation from which we can recover the EIS.  We discuss issues in estimation, 
measurement, and identification in section 5 and present the new estimates of the EIS in 
section 6.  There is a brief conclusion. 
       
2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics on Employer Matching  
Our sample is based on 1,042 individuals eligible to contribute to a 401(k) in 
1991 from the first wave of the HRS, a nationally representative random sample of 51-61 
year olds and their spouses (regardless of age).  The HRS asked detailed questions about 
wealth, demographics, and spousal characteristics in 1992, and household income, tax 
information, and IRA contributions in 1991.  Furthermore, the HRS collected SPDs, 
which are legal descriptions of pensions written in plain English, from employers of HRS 
respondents for all current and previous jobs in which the respondent was covered by a 
pension.  The SPDs give the employer matching formula.  This allows us to measure the 
exact incentives to contribute.          
   
  5We placed four restrictions on the sample.  First, because there are four types of 
employer matching—fixed-rate, discretionary, profit-sharing, and variable-rate 
matching—and the extent of matching is not always known in advance to employees 
making deferral decisions in profit-sharing and discretionary plans, we excluded these 
plans from our sample.  Second, we used the SPDs to construct the complete schedule of 
employer matching contributions for each individual in our sample and applied all 
relevant restrictions on plan eligibility in the SPD, including those due to tenure, hours, 
earnings, age, and vesting of the employer matching contributions.  Third, we identified 
the job in which the respondent was employed in 1991, and then SPDs associated with 
that job that had dates of adoption after 1991 were excluded.  In addition, we used the 
date of last amendment and dates for changes in plan provisions indicated in the text of 
the SPD to exclude plans that were in existence in 1991 but whose features changed 
between 1991 and the time the SPD was collected.  Finally, we kept SPDs only for 
workers with linked administrative earnings data, described below. 
Therefore, based on our sample, Tables 1 and 2 provide selected descriptive 
statistics on employer matching.  Table 1 shows the distribution of employer match rates 
for the 372 workers in plans that match; the remaining 670 workers were in plans that did 
not offer matching.  Columns 1 and 2 indicate that these match rates were clustered at 25, 
50, and 100 percent, where the median match rate was 50 percent.  However, 27 percent 
of the plans offered matches of 100 percent, and three plans offered match rates of 200 
percent.  Because many firms limit the amount of the match, Table 2 shows the 
distribution of matching caps in the analysis sample, expressed as a percent of annual 
  6pay.  Although the median cap was 6 percent of pay, 15 percent of plans had higher caps, 
and 19 percent had caps of less than 4 percent.   
3.  Theoretical Framework 
There are two key implications of these tables.  First, there is substantial cross-
sectional variation in incentives to save based on employer matching.  Indeed, this 
variation is an order of magnitude larger than either typical time-series movements in 
interest rates or cross-sectional variation in after-tax rates of return used to identify Euler-
equation estimates.  Second, the caps on matching generate kinks in the household budget 
set.  In this section, we lay out a theoretical framework that incorporates employer 
matching into the intertemporal allocation decision.
3  Then in section 4 below, we lay out 
estimation techniques rooted in the public economics literature that account for these 
kinks in the budget set.    
 
3.1 Set-up 
  We make the following assumptions:  
1)   Intratemporal direct utility,  ) ; , ( z l C U , is derived from leisure, l, with an 
associated price, 
l q , consumption of a composite good,C , with an associated 
price, 
c q , and a vector of demographics, z , and is intratemporally weakly 
separable and intertemporally additively separable.  Because consumption and 
hours are not fully observed in the HRS, we work with the indirect, rather than 
the direct, utility function.  Specifically, let  ) ; , ( z q y V  be the intratemporal 
indirect utility function.  It takes as arguments the vector of prices of leisure and 
consumption, q, full income,  y , and the vector of demographics, z . 
 
                                                 
3 Second, to keep the model tractable and because the EIS is only defined for a stable set of preferences and 
is based on a neo-classical approach to consumer behavior, we have assumed full rationality in choices, 
perfect information, no fixed costs, and ignored other anomalies highlighted in the behavioral economics 
approach, such as inertia and passivity, that recently have been argued to be important determinants of 
401(k) participation (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002, 2003, 2004). 
  72)  The consumer faces a per period probability of survival of ρ , with period K  
being the known maximum length of life, and with probability  ρ − 1,  t h e  
consumer dies and receives the terminal payoff  ) (
T W Φ , the utility of bequests, 
which is a function of total wealth, 
T W ;  The lifetime is composed of two parts: 
from period N to K , the consumer is retired and no hours of labor are supplied 
to the market, so leisure equals the time endowment, and from period 0 to  1 - N , 
the consumer works, and the timing of retirement in period N is endogenous;  
 
3) Total wealth is accumulated in three forms when working: retirement-account 
wealth, defined as the sum of IRA, 401(k), and non-401(k) DC wealth, 
k ; employer-provided defined-benefit pensions and 
Social Security, 
DB W ; and taxable assets, 
TA W .
DC IRA RA W W W W
401 + + ≡
4  Let 
h s  be the beginning-of-
period share of total wealth in asset type h,  DB TA, , RA h = .  Defined-benefit 
pension wealth evolves as   , s  where 
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3.2  Retirement Accounts 
 
    There  are  minimum-  and  maximum-contribution constraints on 401(k)s and 
IRAs (with multipliers in square brackets), respectively, 
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where   and   are the upper limits on 401(k) and IRA  contributions, 
respectively.  Let 




M  be the employer’s matching contribution in dollars on the 
employee’s 401(k) contribution,  , where   is twice 






t t y Q M M m =
                                                 
4 We abstract here from a treatment of housing, but, in Engelhardt and Kumar (2006), we expand the model 
to include a detailed treatment of housing equity and constraints on mortgage borrowing.  Those extensions 
do not affect the results in the current analysis.  
  8continuously differentiable,   is labor earnings, and   is a vector of plan-specified 
match rates.  There are the following minimum and maximum constraints on IRA 
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Equation (6) states that the withdrawal cannot exceed the beginning-of-period IRA 
wealth.
 5  
  Retirement wealth can be invested either in bonds, with riskless pre-tax return 
B r , or in stocks, with a risky pre-tax return  
1
1








t ,         ( 7 )  
where π  is the constant inflation rate, d is the constant nominal dividend yield, and g   ~    
the stochastic nominal capital gain earned from the beginning of period t to the 
beginning of period  .  Let 
is
1 + t
RA R  be the weighted-average return on wealth in 
retirement accounts, 













t r r + + + − ≡ ϑ ϑ ,     (8) 
where   is the share of retirement-account wealth invested in stocks.  Then retirement-
















t Q Q M Q F W R W − + + + = +      (9) 
                                                 
5 In (5),   is a dummy variable that is one if the individual is age 70½ or older and is zero 
otherwise, and   is the individual’s life expectancy.  Thus, if under age 70½, the withdrawal must be 
greater than or equal to zero, and, if age 70½ or older, the withdrawal must satisfy the minimum-
distribution requirements under federal law that are a function of life expectancy.   
2 / 1 70− Age D
h
  9where   is the employer’s non-matching contribution for the plan. F
6   
 
3.3  Taxable Assets 
 
The equation of evolution for taxable assets is  
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where 
TA R  is the return on taxable wealth, 










t r r R + + + − ≡ ϑ ϑ ,     (11) 
TA ϑ  is the share of taxable wealth invested in stocks,   is other income,   is the gross 






l y l ≡ − )
T  is the sum of income and payroll taxes, and the IRA early withdrawal penalty.   
We model T  as a twice continuously differentiable function of federal taxable income, 
non-qualified IRA withdrawals, and deductible IRA contributions,  , where 
IRAC
t tQ ζ ζ  is 
the fraction of IRA contributions that is tax-deductible. 
 
3.4  Constraints 
 
 
 Equations (9), (10), and the DB accrual equation above sum to yield the 
intertemporal budget constraint that determines  .  In addition to the constraints on 
IRA withdrawals, 401(k) and IRA contributions, there are two other important constraints 
on behavior.  First, there is a liquidity constraint,  
T
t W 1 +
0 ≥
TA
t W ,         ( 1 2 )  
                                                 
6 These would be contributions the employer makes on a periodic basis, as specified in the SPD, but are not 
related to any voluntary or mandatory contributions by the employee: for example, those defined as a 
percentage of pay in a money purchase plan or as a function of some measure of firm performance in a 
profit-sharing plan.   
  10such that total per period full expenditure (also referred to as “full income” in the two-
stage budgeting literature),  y , defined as 
t t t
c
t t l w C q y + ≡ ,     (13) 
must be less than or equal to total net cash on hand,  X , defined as beginning-of-period 
liquid taxable wealth and other income on hand, plus the market value of the leisure 
endowment, less the tax liability, less any tax-deferred saving, plus any IRA wealth made 
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) ( 401 .  (14) 
Let t μ  be the associated Kuhn-Tucker multiplier.  We assume that DB, DC, and 401(k) 
wealth are illiquid until retirement and cannot be used as collateral, but we allow IRA 
withdrawals when working   
  Second, the consumer must decide which assets to hold in taxable and tax-
deferred forms, where there are constraints on the shares of retirement-account and 
taxable assets allocated to stocks:  
0 ≥
RA
t ϑ ,      [
0
t ϖ ] (15) 
1 ≤
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  To summarize, the only forms of “active” saving when working are through 
contributions to 401(k), IRA, or taxable assets.  However, the primary technology for 
smoothing resources across periods when working is through taxable-asset saving, 
  11because 401(k) saving is illiquid; IRA contributions are not necessarily illiquid because 
of the availability of withdrawals, but IRA withdrawals may incur a tax penalty; and 
traditional pensions and Social Security are illiquid.  This means that the consumer’s 
optimization does not imply automatically that all active saving be allocated first to the 
tax-preferred asset with the highest net return, because, in the face of uncertainty, the 
consumer must balance the desire for a high return with the need for liquidity.
7 
 
3.5  First-Order Conditions 
 
  Each period when working, the consumer chooses consumption, leisure, voluntary 
401(k) contributions, IRA contributions, IRA withdrawals, and the shares of retirement-
account and taxable wealth held in risky stocks, respectively.
8 Following Browning, 
Deaton, and Irish (1985), let   be the sum of current and future expected utility 
based on total wealth in period  .  The individual makes all decisions at the beginning of 
the period, based on the information set, 
) (
* T
t t W V
t
t Ω , after which, 
s r is realized,E  is the 
expectations operator conditional on the information set, and β  is the discount rate.    
  We express the optimization in terms of two-stage budgeting.
9   In the first-stage, 
the individual chooses full income, dis-saving through IRA withdrawals, and the 
portfolio allocations to stock of retirement-account and taxable wealth, and must allocate 
total “active” saving to three asset categories—401(k), IRA, and taxable assets—to 
maximize the expected present discounted value of lifetime indirect utility.  In the second 
                                                 
7 Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming) discuss this in detail. 
8 Each period when retired, the consumer chooses consumption, IRA contributions, IRA withdrawals, and 
receives eligible pension and Social Security benefits. 
9 The necessary condition for two-stage budgeting is that utility be weakly separable (Gorman, 1959).  The 
model assumes strongly intertemporally and weakly intratemporally separable preferences, so that a two-
stage budgeting interpretation is valid.   
  12stage, optimal full income,  , in each period is allocated statically between the goods 
that enter direct utility: consumption and leisure. Then for any time  ,  , the 
dynamic optimization problem can be written as 
* y
t N < t
{
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The first-order conditions when working for 401(k) contributions, IRA 
contributions, and full income can be expressed as 
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and 
{ } t W t W t
TA
t t t t y T
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T
t V R E y V μ β ρ β ρ + Φ − + =
+ + ] ) 1 ( [ ) ; , (
1 1
* z q ,    (22) 
respectively, where subscripts indicate a partial derivative (other than t, which denotes 
time): for example,   is simply the marginal tax rate;   is the marginal employer 
match rate for an additional dollar of 401(k) contribution; 
I T k Q M 401
l y ζ  is the change in the 
fraction of an IRA contribution that is deductible for an additional dollar of labor income; 
 is the marginal utility of full income. y V
10  
                                                 
10 The complete set of first-order conditions is available upon request. 
  13We define the tax and match prices  ,  , and 
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Intuitively, this equation says that the marginal value of an additional dollar of 401(k) 
saving must be just equal to that of a dollar of IRA saving at the optimum.  In particular, 
on the left-hand side, for an employee who is not offered a match ( ), an additional 
dollar contributed to the 401(k) costs  , the tax price, and is valued (in utils) 
according to the marginal utility of income,  , plus the shadow value of the contribution 
constraints if the employee is at one of the two 401(k) corner solutions.   On the right-
hand side, one dollar contributed to the IRA costs  , the tax price, valued by the 
marginal utility of income, plus the shadow value of the contribution constraints if the 
employee is at one of the two IRA corner solutions.  For an employee of a firm that offers 
matching contributions with a marginal match rate of  , the left-hand side accounts 
for the fact that, with matching, only 1  of a dollar must be foregone by the 
employee to get an incremental dollar in the 401(k) account.  In the simplifying case of 
























11 Importantly, ζ  itself is a function of 401(k) participation, because 401(k) contributions reduce adjusted 
gross income (AGI), and AGI helps to determine the extent of IRA deductibility.   Consequently, the tax 
price for 401(k) saving is defined as  , where  ) 1 ( 1
401 IRA
t t y t
k
t Q p l ζ τ − − ≡ l y ζ  is the change in the fraction 
of an IRA contribution that is deductible for an additional dollar of 401(k) contribution. 
  14reduces to  ,  which indicates that what matters for the optimal decision 










4.  Identifying the EIS from 401(k) Participation 
  Next, we show how we use the variation in employer matching schemes 
documented in section II, along with the arbitrage condition, to estimate the EIS in a 
theoretically coherent, non-linear budget-set econometric framework that accounts for the 
kinks induced by the caps on the generosity of the match.  Specifically, let   









t t υ υ − ≡ Δ
 to yield 
t
m
t y t t p V p υ η Δ + ⋅ Δ = Δ ,      ( 2 4 )  
where,   and  .  The left-hand side of (24) is zero when 
the worker participates in the 401(k), negative if the worker does not participate, and is 
the latent variable in our discrete choice econometric model.   
υ Δ
) ( 401 k IRA m p p p p − ≡
 Because  the  EIS is defined as  yy y yV V / ) (−  (Browning, 1987), the key to 
implementing (24) is to specify the functional form for  , the marginal utility of 
income.  We follow Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) and flexibly model the 
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In (25), the EIS is embodied in the parameterλ :  
) 1 /( 1 / ) ( λ − = − ≡ yy y yV V EIS .         (26) 
  15For example, if  5 . 0 − = λ , then the EIS is  . 67 . 0
12   In the special case when 0 = λ , the 
indirect utility function becomes 
)] ( ln[
)] ( ln[ ) ln(








⋅ Ψ = ,      ( 2 7 )  
which is a member of the class of the PIGLOG indirect utility functions (Muellbauer, 
1976), that has been used extensively in the literature on consumption.  With log utility, 
the EIS is 1.  
  The goal then is to use (24), (25), and the rich HRS data to estimate λ  and 
calculate the EIS.  To do so, first note that from (25) the marginal indirect utility of 
income,  , is  y V














Vy .      ( 2 8 )  
The factor   is a utility scaling factor that is a function of exogenous demographic 





m i m i z , ) ( ψ z ,      ( 2 9 )  
where   is an   vector that includes a constant.  Second, in (25) a is homogeneous 
of degree one, and b  is homogeneous of degree zero and modeled as a Cobb-Douglas 
price aggregator  
z 1 × m




γ ) (q ,     ( 3 0 )  
                                                 
12 We refer to the EIS in absolute value terms to make comparisons with the Euler-equation literature more 
straightforward.   
  16across the   goods that enter the direct utility function, where  k 0 = ∑
k
k γ .  Because we 
assume only two goods enter direct utility, leisure  ) 1 ( = k  and consumption  ) 2 ( = k , 
respectively, this implies  1 2 γ γ − = , so that (30) reduces to 
k b
γ ω = ) (q ,         ( 3 1 )  
where   is the real relative price of leisure.  Finally, the second term on the 
right-hand side of (24) is zero when IRA saving is at an interior solution, positive when 
constrained by the upper IRA limit, and negative when at the lower IRA limit (of zero).  
Therefore, let 
c l q q / ≡ ω
) (
0 D D p
IRA L m − ≡ κ ,     ( 3 2 )  
where   is a dummy variable that is one if IRA contributions are at the upper limit 
and zero otherwise, and   is a dummy variable that is one if IRA contributions are zero 
and zero otherwise.   
IRA L D
0 D
There are very few workers in our sample whose contributions equal the 401(k) 
plan maximum in the data.  Therefore, we consider just the participation decision in the 
empirical analysis, so that the left-hand side of (24) collapses to  , and (24), (28), 
(29), (31), and (32) combine to yield the following discrete choice econometric model of 
401(k) participation: 
0 η −
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  17where  1 1 /γ ψ δ m m ≡ ,   denotes the desired 401(k) contribution, i and 
* ) ( 401 k
ijt Q j  index 
individuals and 401(k) plans, respectively, and u  is the error term.  Again, in (33) the EIS 
is embodied in λ , one of the parameters we will estimate using the HRS data.
13      
In the empirical analysis below,   includes a constant, the worker’s education (in 
years), age, and dummy variables for whether the worker was married, white, and female, 
respectively.  These demographic characteristics enter (33) parsimoniously and allow 
employer matching to have a heterogeneous effect on 401(k) participation for different 
demographic groups.  The last term on the right-hand side of (33) includes  , a vector 
that contains a constant and exogenous employer and employment characteristics.  These 
are additional factors, explained below, that fall outside of the scope of this theoretical 




5.   Estimation, Measurement, and Identification 
  Because the caps on the generosity of employer matching induce kinks in the 
household’s budget set, we apply non-linear budget-set techniques rooted in the public 
economics literature to estimate the EIS.  Specifically, as an alternative to the maximum-
likelihood piecewise-linear-budget-set estimation summarized in Hausman (1985) and 
Moffitt (1986, 1990)—and the recent, related non-parametric extensions by Blomquist 
and Newey (2002)—and the maximum likelihood differentiable-budget-constraint 
methodology of MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990), we employ instrumental-variable 
                                                 
13 The primary distinction between this paper and Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming) is that in the latter 
we assumed  0 = λ  and used the associated PIGLOG preferences in (27).  This had the virtue of yielding a 
linear-in-parameters econometric model—this can be seen by setting  0 = λ  in (33)—and made for 
substantially easier estimation.  In addition, the focus of Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming) was on the 
impact of employer matching on 401(k) saving and on pension-plan design.  In contrast, the current paper 
focuses on the estimation of the EIS.   
  18techniques from Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming) that linearize the budget set at the 
observed outcome to calculate the price and virtual-income terms and then instruments to 
correct for endogeneity, which also has a long history, but recent examples of which are 
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999, 2005).    
  To do so,  the tax and match prices,  ,  , and  , the net wage, 
IRA p
m p
) ( 401 k p ω , and 
income,  y , must be calculated for all observed 401(k)  outcomes in the dataset in order 
to construct the explanatory variables in (33).  Because budget-set slopes are not defined 
at kink points, we use a variant of the method of Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) to calculate 
,  , and   for each individual in the sample.  First, we lay out the budget set 
in detail using the matching formulas in the SPDs, tax-rate information from NBER’s 
TAXSIM calculator, and detailed household financial and demographic characteristics.  
In doing so, we minimize the impact of measurement error by the use of extensive 
administrative data, namely Social Security covered-earnings histories from 1951-1991 
and W-2 earnings records for jobs held from 1980-1991 that were provided by SSA and 
IRS and linked to HRS respondents.  The W-2s provide administrative data on earnings 
and 401(k) participation and contributions for 1991 (Cunningham and Engelhardt, 2002).  
We combine the W-2s, Social Security covered-earnings histories, and self-reported 
earnings histories to construct complete earnings histories from 1951-1991 for each 
member of our sample, which are used with Social Security and pension-benefit 
calculators to calculate pension wealth, accruals and changes in accruals, for 1991 and 
1992, respectively, which are inputs into the net wage measure, 
IRA p
m p
) ( 401 k p
ω , which is quite 
complicated and described in detail in the data appendix.  Second, we smooth the kinks in 
the budget set non-parametrically using kernel regression of the implicit (negative) tax 
  19rate from the employer matching and tax subsidy to contributions on AGI over the federal 
legally allowable range of 401(k) contributions of 0 to $9500 using a second-order 
Gaussian kernel, with bandwidth chosen by Silverman’s rule of thumb.  Finally, because 
match and tax rates differ by worker, we do this on a household-by-household basis, so 
that the smoothing is household-budget-set specific.
14  
  In accordance with life-cycle-consistent models, we measure income,  y , as “full 
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which includes the market value of the leisure endowment.  Under two-stage budgeting, 
the capital income and net (dis-)saving terms embodied in the change in assets are 
sufficient statistics for the past and the expectations of future variables (Blundell and 
Macurdy, 1999).  However, because of the non-linear structure of matching and marginal 
tax rates, the tax and match prices,  ,  , and  , change depending upon the 
budget-set segment (either because the marginal match rate or tax rate changes), and, 
hence, the implicit tax liability from the employer-matching and tax subsidies will change 
depending upon the budget-set segment.  Therefore, more precisely, we measure income 
as “virtual” full income,  , according to the respective budget segment, where we 
numerically integrate the estimated kernel-smoothed implicit tax function described 
above to calculate the associated implicit tax liability used to virtualize income.
IRA p
m p
) ( 401 k p
v y
15  
Finally, because the explanatory variables in (33) have components based on 
choice variables, we instrument to correct for endogeneity.  Our instrument set, Z, 
                                                 
14 See the data appendix for details.   
15 See Engelhardt and Kumar (2006) for details. 
  20includes the vector of demographics,  , and three additional variables drawn from the 
information set,  ,  , and  : the first is a dummy variable if the 
household was in poor financial condition in 1990, and the second and the third are based 
on “first-dollar” match and marginal tax rates for a synthetic taxpayer in 1989, where the 
subscript   denotes a synthetic taxpayer.  There are two primary sources of variation in 
the instruments.  First,   varies by plan, 
z
FC









t p − •
•
j .  That is, we assume that the variation in 
matching schedules across plans is exogenous: in particular, there is no labor-market 
sorting of workers to firms that offer employer matching based on their responsiveness to 
rates of return.  This is a standard assumption in the empirical pension-saving literature 
(Bernheim, 2003).  Second,   and   vary across synthetic individuals because 
the tax function is non-linear in income and marital status.   We describe the construction 
of the instruments and discuss the sources of identification in more detail in the data 
appendix.     
IRAz p
z k) ( 401 p
  
6.  Estimation Results  
Because the econometric model in (33) is non-linear in parameters, we estimate 
the parameters by an extension of two-stage conditional maximum likelihood to non-
linear models as proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986), where  , on our 
sample of 1,042 workers in the HRS.  This control-function approach also has been 
suggested for non-parametric models with endogeneity and selection by Das, Newey, and 
Vella (2003).  Descriptive statistics for selected variables used in the empirical analysis 
are shown in Table 3.  The participation rate in the sample is 56%. 
) , 0 ( ~
2 σ N u
  21One potential concern with this sample is that it may be non-random, because it is 
based on individuals for whom the HRS was able to obtain an SPD for the plan and 
administrative earning records.  Therefore, we follow Engelhardt and Kumar 
(forthcoming, 2007) and correct our estimates for possible selection following Vella 
(1992) and using two exclusion restrictions based on IRS Form 5500 data: the incidence 
of pension-plan outsourcing by Census region, employment-size category, one-digit SIC 
code, and union status (union plan vs. non-union plan) cell in 1992; and the incidence of 
pension-plan consolidation due to mergers and acquisitions by cell from 1988-1992.   We 
also include two other variables as exclusions in the selection equations—dummies for 
whether the individual left the job because the business closed or was laid off, 
respectively—which help to measure whether the employer possibly was in financial 
difficulty or failure at the time of severance.   Outsourcing, consolidation, and business 
failure would have made it more difficult for the HRS to have obtained an SPD.  We 
discuss construction of the exclusions and the selection equation in detail in the data 
appendix.
16 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the parameter estimates that account for selection and 
endogeneity with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses.
17  Column 1 
shows the estimates from the baseline specification, which does not include any 
                                                 
16 The exclusions must be correlated with the likelihood of being in the sample, but uncorrelated with 
saving behavior.  Because it is difficult to come up with exclusions that explain who consented to have 
their earnings records included in the HRS, we focused on exclusions that explain the likelihood of being 
linked to an SPD.  Even though our exclusions focus on just one dimension of the selection, these variables 
are valid exclusions. 
17 All confidence intervals presented in the analysis below were based on 199 bootstrapped replications. 
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1986).  The selection and first-stage equations were re-estimated for each bootstrap 
sample.  We checked the sensitivity of the confidence intervals to the number of bootstrap replications and, 
for example, found that the standard errors were not appreciably different with more than 199 replications. 
Panel E shows the parameter estimates on the exclusion restrictions in the selection model.  In particular, 
greater plan outsourcing, consolidation, business closure and layoffs significantly decrease the likelihood of 
having a matched SPD.  
  22additional covariates in the   vector in (19).  Here,  , which implies an EIS 
of  .  With a 95% confidence interval that ranges from   to  , we can reject 
the null hypothesis of an EIS of zero. 
x 1985 . 0 ˆ − = λ
52 . 0 83 . 0 01 . 1
We show the estimates for the other main parameters in the econometric model in 
panel C.  However, because the model is both structural and non-linear in parameters, it 
is difficult to interpret those parameters economically.  Hence, to aid interpretation, we 
also present in panel D the marginal effects on 401(k) participation of each of the main 
economic variables in the model: the employer match rate, virtual full income, the 
marginal tax rate, and the net wage.  As expected, the marginal effects of an increase in 
the match and tax rates are to raise participation, respectively.  For example, an increase 
in the match of one dollar for each dollar of employee contribution raises participation by 
seven percentage points.  This effect is statistically significant.
18  In addition, the income 
effect is negative, as anticipated if consumption and leisure are normal goods: an increase 
in full income of $100,000 lowers participation by one percentage point.  This is 
statistically significant and suggests that participation is quite income-inelastic.  These 
marginal effects are consistent with the results in Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming). 
 
6.1 Robustness Checks and Extensions 
One potential limitation of this specification is that firms may offer employer 
matching contributions as a way to try to avoid failing federal pension non-discrimination 
rules because they have low-saving employees (McGill, et al., 1996).  In addition, firms 
that match may adopt other plan features to stimulate employee saving (e.g., allow for 
                                                 
18 The confidence intervals for the marginal effects are not shown, but available upon request. 
  23borrowing against plan balances, self-directed investment, offer after-tax saving options, 
offer retirement seminars, etc.) or offer different fringe benefit packages that might affect 
saving behavior than firms that do not match.  Omission of these factors from the 
specification might impart bias to our estimates of the EIS.   
Therefore, in column 2, we add to the baseline specification two sets of additional 
explanatory variables: 1) fringe benefits offered: dummy variables for whether the firm 
offered long-term disability and group term life insurance, respectively, as well as the 
number of health insurance plans, number of retiree health insurance plans, weeks paid 
vacation, and days of sick pay; 2) other plan characteristics: dummy variables for 
whether the 401(k) allowed borrowing, hardship withdrawals, self-directed investment, 
had an after-tax saving option, a 401(k) contribution limit less than the federal limit, 
respectively, whether the firm offered other traditional pensions, and a measure of 
whether similar firms offering 401(k)s faced substantial non-discrimination “pressure” 
that we developed in Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming).
19  Now,  , which 
implies an EIS of  .  The 95% confidence interval for the EIS ranges from   to 
 and encompasses 1, which represents log utility.   
3108 . 0 ˆ − = λ
0 76 . 0 47 .
26 . 1
In the remaining columns, we enter additional variables into the specification and 
allow for interactions to check the robustness of the estimates.  Specifically, in column 3, 
we add dummy variables for firm-size category, union, and region and their interactions 
                                                 
19 Specifically, this measure is the share of workers with earnings above the federal threshold for the 
definition of a “highly-compensated” employee under federal non-discrimination regulations in the 
respondent’s Census-region-by-employment-size-category-by-one-digit-SIC-code-by-union-status cell in 
1989, constructed from the March CPS, and weighted by the difference in combined federal and state 
marginal tax rates on earnings for the median highly- and non-highly-compensated workers in the cell to 
reflect the value a highly-compensated worker would put on a dollar of tax-deferred salary through a 
401(k) relative to that for a non-highly-compensated worker.  See Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming) for 
details. 
  24with the fringe benefits and plan characteristics.  The estimate of λ  for this specification 
is   and changes very little from that in column 2.  It implies an EIS of  .    2534 . 0 − 79 . 0
We show the richest specification in column 4, where we include additional 
employment characteristics: dummy variables for both the worker and spouse for whether 
the firm offered a retirement seminar, discussed retirement with co-workers, whether 
responsible for the pay and promotion of others, the number of supervisees, spousal 
pension coverage, a full set of occupation dummies, and interactions of the occupation 
dummies with the fringe benefits, plan characteristics, and other employment 
characteristics.  These additional controls have little impact on the results, with 
, which implies an EIS of  .  The 95% confidence interval ranges from 
 to  .   
3534 . 0 ˆ − = λ
37 . 0 21 . 1
74 . 0
 
7.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we depart from the Euler-equation methods from the previous 
literature and take a novel approach to show how a life-cycle-consistent econometric 
specification of employee 401(k) participation can be used to generate new estimates of 
the EIS.  Our key insight is that substantial variation in employer matching provides 
large, plausibly exogenous variation in the effective rate of return that can be used to 
identify the EIS.   Using this variation and very rich administrative data, and for the 
richest specification (column 4, Table 4), we estimate the EIS to be  .  The 95% 
confidence interval ranges from   to  . Our estimates are remarkably robust to a 
large set of control variables and provide new evidence that consumers are fairly 
74 . 0
37 . 0 21 . 1
  25responsive to changes in the effective rate of return when making saving and 
consumption decisions..
20   
Although based on a different methodology, our findings are consistent with the 
point estimates of Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Ziliak and Kniesner (2005), but 
substantially larger than those by Hall (1988), Dynan (1993), and Barsky, Kimball, 
Juster, and Shapiro (1997).  Because many workers with 401(k)s invest in equities in 
their accounts, our results are also consistent with the findings of Attanasio, Banks, and 
Tanner (2002), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), and Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003) 
that the EIS for stockholders is high.  While those studies treated asset ownership as 
exogenous, our estimate of the EIS comes from the estimation of the decision to own tax-
deferred assets itself.  
                                                 
20 While our point estimates are smaller than the instrumental-variable estimates in Gruber (2006), whose 
instrumental-variable estimation approach used variation in net rates of return from changes to marginal tax 
rates induced by tax reforms, his 95% confidence intervals encompass ours, so that, in a statistical sense, 
our results do not differ from his. 
  26References 
Attanasio, Orazio and Martin Browning, “Consumption over the Life Cycle and the over 
the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review 85:5 (1995): 1118-1137. 
 
Attanasio, Orazio and Guglielmo Weber, “Intertemporal Substitution, Risk Aversion and 
the Euler Equation for Consumption,” Economic Journal 99 (1989): 59-73. 
 
Attanasio, Orazio and Guglielmo Weber, “Consumption Growth, the Interest Rate and 
Aggregration,” Review of Economic Studies 60 (1993): 631-649. 
 
Attanasio, Orazio and Guglielmo Weber, “Is Consumption Growth Consistent with 
Intertemporal Optimization? Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey,” Journal 
of Political Economy 103 (1995): 1121-1157. 
 
Attanasio, Orazio, James Banks, and Sarah Tanner, “Asset Holding and Consumption 
Volatility,” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 771-792. 
 
Barsky, Robert B., Miles S. Kimball, F. Thomas Juster, and Matthew D. Shapiro, 
“Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the 
Health and Retirement Study,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:2 (1997): 537-579. 
 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, “Taxation and Saving,” in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, 
eds., Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North Holland), 2003, pp. 
1173-1249.  
 
Blomquist, Soren, and Whitney Newey, “Nonparametric Estimation with Nonlinear 
Budget Sets,” Econometrica 70 (2002): 2455-2480. 
 
Blundell, Richard, Martin Browning, and Costas Meghir, “Consumer Demand and the 
Life-Cycle Allocation of Expenditures,” Review of Economic Studies 61:1 (1994): 57-80. 
 
Blundell, Richard, and Thomas MaCurdy, “Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative 
Approaches,” in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Volume 3A, (Amsterdam: North Holland), 1999, pp. 1559-1695.  
 
Blundell, Richard, Costas Meghir, and Pedro Neves, “Labour Supply and Intertemporal 
Substitution,” Journal of Econometrics 59 (1993): 137-160. 
 
Browning, Martin, “Which Demand Elasticities Do We Know and Which Do We Need 
to Know for Policy Analysis?” Mimeo., McMaster University, 1987. 
 
Browning, Martin, Angus Deaton, and Margaret Irish, “A Profitable Approach to Labor 
Supply and Commodity Demands over the Life-Cycle,” Econometrica 55:3 (1985): 503-
544. 
 
  27Browning, Martin, and Annamaria Lusardi, “Household Saving: Micro Theories and 
Micro Facts,” Journal of Economic Literature 34:4 (1996): 1797-1855. 
 
Carroll, Christopher, “Death to the Log-Linearized Euler Equation! (And Very Poor 
Health to the Second-Order Approximation),” Advances in Macroeconomics 1:1 (2001), 
Article 6. 
  
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “Defined 
Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least 
Resistance,” in James M. Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 16 (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press), 2002. 
 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “Optimal 
Defaults,” American Economic Review 93:2 (2003): 180-185. 
 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “For Better or 
Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior,” in David A. Wise, ed., 
Perspectives in  the Economics of Aging (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2004, 
pp. 81-125. 
 
Coile, Courtney, and Jonathan Gruber, “Social Security and Retirement,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 7830, 2000. 
 
Cunningham, Christopher R., and Gary V. Engelhardt, “Federal Tax Policy, Employer 
Matching, and 401(k) Saving: Evidence from HRS W-2 Records,” National Tax Journal, 
55:3 (2002): 617-645. 
 
Cunningham, Christopher R., Gary V. Engelhardt, and Anil Kumar, “Measuring Pension 
Wealth,” in Olivia Mitchell, Beth Soldo, and Brigitte Madrian, eds. Redefining 
Retirement: How Will Boomers Fare?, Oxford University Press, 2007 (forthcoming). 
 
Das, Mitali, Whitney K. Newey, and Francis Vella, “Nonparametric Estimation of 
Sample Selection Models,” Review of Economic Studies 70:1 (2003): 33-63. 
 
Dynan, Karen, “How Prudent Are Consumers?,” Journal of Political Economy 101 
(1993): 1104-1113. 
 
Efron, Bradley, and Robert Tibshirani, “Bootstrap Methods for Standard Errors, 
Confidence Intervals, and Other Measures of Statistical Accuracy,” Statistical Science 1 
(1986): 54-77. 
 
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Anil Kumar, “Employer Matching and 401(k) Saving: Evidence 
from the Health and Retirement Study,” NBER Working Paper No. 12447, 2006. 
 
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Anil Kumar, “Employer Matching and 401(k) Saving: Evidence 
from the Health and Retirement Study,” Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming. 
  28 
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Anil Kumar, “Pensions and Household Wealth Accumulation,” 
Mimeo, Syracuse University, 2007. 
 
Feenberg, Daniel, and Elisabeth Coutts, “An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12 (1) (Winter) (1993): 189-194. 
 
Gorman, W.M., “Separable Utility and Aggregation,” Econometrica 27:3 (1959): 469-
481. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan, “A Tax-Based Estimate of the Elasticity of Intertemporal 
Substitution,” NBER Working Paper No. 11945, 2006. 
 
Gustman, Alan L., Olivia S. Mitchell, Andrew A. Samwick, and Thomas L. Steinmeier, 
“Pension and Social Security Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study,” in Wealth, 
Work, and Health: Innovations in Measurement in the Social Sciences, James Smith and 
Robert Willis, eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press) 1999, pp. 150-208. 
 
Hall, Robert, “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,” Journal of Political Economy 
96 (1988): 339-57. 
 
Hausman, Jerry A., “The Econometrics of Nonlinear Budget Sets,” Econometrica  
(November) 53 (1985), 1255-1282. 
 
Ibbotson Associates, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation, 2003 Yearbook (Chicago: 
Ibbotson Associates), 2003. 
 
Ludvigson, Sydney, and Christina H. Paxson, “Approximation Bias in Linearized Euler 
Equations,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83:2 (2001): 242-256. 
 
MaCurdy, Thomas E., David Green, and Harry Paarsch, “Assessing Empirical 
Approaches for Analyzing Taxes and Labor Supply,” Journal of Human Resources 25 
(Summer 1990): 415–90. 
 
McGill, Dan M., Kyle N. Brown, John J. Haley, and Sylvester J. Schieber, Fundamentals 
of Private Pensions, Seventh Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 
1996. 
 
Mitchell, Olivia, Jan Olson, and Thomas Steinmeier, “Construction of the Earnings and 
Benefits File (EBF) for Use with the Health and Retirement Survey,” HRS/AHEAD 
Documentation Report No. DR-001, Institute for Social Research, University of 
Michigan, 1996. 
 
Moffitt, Robert A., “The Econometrics of Piecewise-Linear Budget Constraints,” Journal 
of Business and Economic Statistics 4 (1986): 317-328. 
 
  29Moffitt, Robert A., “The Econometrics of Kinked Budget Constraints,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4 (1990): 119-139. 
 
Muellbauer, John, “Community Preferences and the Representative Consumer,” 
Econometrica 44:5 (1976): 979-999. 
 
Mulligan, Casey, “Capital, Interest, and Aggregate Intertemporal Substitution,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 9373, 2002. 
 
Skinner, Jonathan, “Variable Lifespan and the Intertemporal Elasticity of Consumption,” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 67:4 (1985): 616-623. 
 
Smith, Richard J., and Richard W. Blundell, “An Exogeneity Test for a Simulaneous 
Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply,” Econometrica 54:3 (1986): 
679-686. 
 
Vella, Francis, “Simple Tests for Sample Selection Bias in Censored and Discrete Choice 
Models,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 7:4 (1992): 412-421. 
 
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, “Limited Asset Market Participation and the Elasticity of 
Intertemporal Substitution,” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 825-853. 
 
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, and Orazio Attanasio, “Stock-Market Participation, 
Intertemporal Substitution, and Risk Aversion,” American Economic Review 93:2 (2003): 
383-391. 
 
Yogo, Motohiro, “Estiamting the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution when 
Instruments are Weak,” Review of Economics and Statistics 86:3 (2004): 797-810. 
 
Ziliak, James, and Thomas Kniesner, “Estimating Life Cycle Labor Supply Tax Effects,” 
Journal of Political Economy 107 (April 1999): 326-359. 
 
Ziliak, James P., and Thomas J. Kniesner, “The Effect of Income Taxation on 
Consumption and Labor Supply,” Journal of Labor Economics 23:4 (2005): 769-796. 
 
  30Data Appendix 
 
This material that follows is from the appendix in Engelhardt and Kumar 
(forthcoming). It describes the construction of and gives background on the analysis 
dataset.  The interested reader also should consult Engelhardt and Kumar (2006).  The 
data are drawn from the first wave of the HRS, a nationally representative random sample 
of 51-61 year olds and their spouses (regardless of age), which asked detailed questions 
about wealth, demographics, and spousal characteristics in 1992, and household income, 
tax information, and IRA contributions in 1991.  So, for the purposes of the empirical 
analysis, periods t and   refer to 1991 and 1992, respectively.    1 + t
 
The sample consists of 1,042 individuals from wave 1 of the HRS who were 
employed in 1991, eligible for a 401(k), whose employer provided a SPD for the plan, 
and who had linked administrative W-2 and Social Security earnings data.  The 
restricted-access employer-provided SPDs are distributed as the HRS Wave 1 Pension 
Plan Detail Data Set (Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier, 1999).  This dataset 
contains plan type, eligibility rules, benefit formulae, employer contribution and 
matching formulae, early and normal retirement dates, and other information described in 
the SPD, but not any information for individual employees.  The W-2 data are distributed 
as the HRS Wages and Self-Employment Income in Covered and Non-Covered Jobs 
dataset (Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier, 1996).  The dataset is a cross-section for 1991 
because even though there are earnings and deferral data prior to 1991, there are no data 
on other income and wealth needed to construct full income prior to 1991 in the HRS.  
Some of the individuals in the sample worked in 1991 but were retired at the time of the 
first interview in 1992.  Exclusion of these individuals had no impact on the estimation 
results.   
 
There are four types of employer matching: fixed-rate, discretionary, profit-
sharing, and variable-rate matching.  Because the extent of matching is not always known 
in advance to employees making deferral decisions in profit-sharing and discretionary 
plans, these plans were not included in our sample.  The SPDs were used to construct the 
complete schedule of employer matching contributions for each individual in our sample 
and applied all relevant restrictions on plan eligibility in the SPD, including those due to 
tenure, hours, earnings, age, and vesting of the employer matching contributions.   
 
  Because workers’ budget sets can have multiple kinks and, therefore, multiple 
points of non-differentiability, from changes in match and marginal tax rates, a smooth, 
differentiable budget set around all kink points was constructed, following the 
methodology of MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990).  Specifically, kernel regression of 
the implicit subsidy from employer matching and tax deductibility on the set of potential 
contributions from 0 to $9500 (the federal maximum contribution in 1991) by $50 
increments was used to smooth the budget set, using the Gaussian kernel, 
2 /
2
) 2 / 1 ( ) (
z e z K
− = π , with bandwidth chosen by Silverman’s rule of thumb, 
, where 
5 / 1 / 06 . 1 n m h = ) 349 . 1 / , var min( x x iqr m =  and iqrx is the inter-quartile range.   
  31A smooth marginal implicit subsidy function was constructed from the kernel-regression 
estimates.   
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where   is taxable assets,   is the gross wage,   is the leisure endowment,   is 





IRAW Q T  is taxes 
paid.  The full income measure includes the market value of the leisure endowment.  
Under two-stage budgeting, the capital income and net (dis-)saving terms embodied in 
the change in assets,  , are sufficient statistics for the past and the expectations of 
future variables (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999).  The respondent-reported income in wave 
1 of the HRS referred to behavior in calendar year 1991; hence, 
A Δ
W Δ  was formed by 
using taxable wealth in 1992 taken from wave 1, taxable wealth in 1991, which was 
capitalized from 1991 capital income, a technique is commonly used in the literature, and 
TA R  constructed from a weighted-average gross return based on returns in Ibbotson 
(2003).  Tax rules from 1991 were used to construct an IRA phase-out calculator to 
determine  ζ  and  l y ζ , and household income, tax, and demographic data and NBER’s 
TAXSIM calculator (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) were used to construct marginal tax 
rates and taxes paid for each household.  The estimated kernel-regression function was 
numerically integrated to obtain the dollar amount of implicit subsidy for every level of 
potential 401(k) contribution, which, with full income, was used to construct virtual full 
income along all portions of the budget sets.    
 
The construction of the net wage, ω , is described in detail in Engelhardt and 
Kumar (2006).  For the private and public pension components in ω , individuals were 
divided into cells based on exogenous demographic characteristics and the Social 
Security covered earnings from 1951-1991 and W-2 earnings records from 1980-1991 
were used to calculate earnings histories for a synthetic-cell individual.  These synthetic 
earnings histories were input as follows: 1) into the University of Michigan’s Pension 
Estimation Program to calculate defined benefit pension wealth, accrual, and change in 
accrual for additional earnings for individuals with DB plans; 2) into the HRS DC/401(k) 
Calculator (Cunningham, Engelhardt, and Kumar, 2007) developed to calculate for 
individuals with defined contribution plans their DC pension wealth, non-matching 
contributions and the effect of additional earnings thereon, respectively; the impact of 
additional earnings on employer match on voluntary contributions; required 401(k) 
contributions and the impact of additional earnings thereon, respectively; and, 3) into the 
Social Security benefit calculator developed by Coile and Gruber (2000) to calculate 
Social Security wealth, accrual, and change in accrual for additional earnings.  The effect 
of additional earnings on the employer match to voluntary contributions was calculated 
assuming a 401(k) contribution of 50 dollars for all individuals (regardless of actual 
contribution level).   
 
Finally, the sample is likely non-random because it is based on individuals for 
whom the HRS was able to obtain 1) an employer-provided SPD for the 401(k) plan, and 
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histories.  To understand the exclusion restrictions that were developed, it is useful to 
note the manner in which the HRS obtained the SPDs and administrative earnings data.  
The HRS asked all respondents who reported being in a (current or past) pension-covered 
job to provide the name and address of the employer.  To maintain respondent 
confidentiality, the HRS attempted to contact the employer, not about the respondent’s 
pension(s), but more generally as part of a survey of pension providers in which the HRS 
requested copies of SPDs for the universe of pensions the employer provided (to all 
employees).  The HRS then “matched” from this universe the appropriate pension(s) to 
the respondent based on the respondent’s characteristics, e.g., union status, method of pay 
(hourly, salaried, commission, piece rate), occupation, tenure, etc.   The “match” rates 
were well below 100 percent: 65 percent of those currently working in pension-covered 
jobs, 66 percent for the last job for those not working, and 35 percent for jobs held five 
years or longer prior to the current (last) job for those working (not working).  
 
There are a number of important reasons for the failure to match an SPD to the 
respondent.  First, the respondent may not have given correct employer name and 
address.  Second, the HRS may have failed to receive the SPD because the employer may 
have refused to comply with the pension provider survey, the employer could not be 
located at the address given, or the employer went out of business or merged with another 
company and no longer existed under the name given by the respondent.  Third, the 
employer may have submitted an SPD, but the HRS was unable to match the SPD to the 
respondent based on the plan detail and the respondent’s characteristics.  This is less 
likely for union and public sector workers, who are easy to identify and whose plans are 
easy to obtain, and more likely for workers whose employers had undergone mergers and 
acquisitions with subsequent plan modifications.   
 
  The exclusion restrictions were constructed as follows.  First, Form 5500 data for 
1988-1992 from the Department of Labor, Employee Benefit Security Administration, on 
the universe of pension plans with 100 or more participants and a 5 percent random 
sample of plans with less than 100 participants were obtained.  Second, plans were 
divided into cells defined by Census region, employment size category, one-digit SIC 
code, year, and union status (union plan vs. non-union plan).  The first exclusion is the 
incidence of pension plan outsourcing by cell in 1992, where outsourcing means the plan 
was administered by an entity other than the employer (weighted using sampling weights 
provided by DOL). The intuition here is that the HRS was less likely to have obtained an 
SPD from the employer if (on average in its cell) plan administration was outsourced, 
because more than one contact was needed (first the employer, then the plan 
administrator) to have received the SPD. (It may well have been that plans that were 
outsourced were better administered and, therefore, employers that outsourced were more 
likely to have returned the pension provider survey.  However, this was likely more than 
offset because the SPD request was significantly less likely to have been fulfilled when 
multiple entities needed to be contacted.) The second exclusion was the incidence of 
pension plan consolidation due mergers and acquisitions by cell from 1988-1992.  The 
intuition here is that the HRS was less likely either to have obtained an SPD from the 
employer or to have matched it to the employee if (on average in its cell) there had been a 
  33lot of plan consolidation, because plan names and detail were often changed upon 
consolidation.  Two other variables were used as exclusions for pensions on past jobs in 
our selection equations: dummies for whether the individual left the job because the 
business closed or was laid off, respectively.  These helped to measure whether the 
employer possibly was in financial difficulty at severance, which, if that resulted in a 
business failure, would have made it more difficult for the HRS to have obtained an SPD.   
 
There were three important considerations in constructing the instruments.  First, 
the instruments were drawn from the information set  t Ω .   Because   is 1991, all 
information from 1989 and 1990 is in the information set and orthogonal to decisions 
made in 1991 under rational expectations.  Second, because the observed marginal match 
and tax rates depend upon 401(k) and IRA contributions,   and   are based 
on first-dollar measures: the employer match on the first dollar contributed and the 
marginal tax rate at which the first dollar contributed is deductible (which equals the tax 
rate on the last dollar of earnings).   Third, to minimize dependence on individual-specific 
income and family size that might be correlated with saving behavior, the first-dollar 
rates were calculated for a synthetic individual of each marital status assumed to have no 
capital income, no children, under age 65, and taking the standard deduction—where 
marital status is assumed exogenous—with synthetic annual labor earnings constructed as 
follows: individuals were divided into cells based on exogenous demographic 
characteristics, and the cell mean gross hourly wage rate, 
t
p
401 IRAz p ⋅
mz p
kz
2 − •t w , was multiplied by 2,000 
annual hours, H .  Let the subscript • denote a synthetic measure and the superscript 0 
denote a first-dollar measure, then  
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t l y t I
kz
t Q T p
− • − • − • − − ≡ ζ ,    (A.3)     
where 
IRA Q  was set to one dollar for all individuals.     
 
    It is important to note that the tax function for  p Δ  in the endogenous variable is 
based on the tax system in 1991, but the tax function for the instruments is different 
because it is based on the tax system in 1989 (indicated by the subscript  in (A.2)-
(A.3) above).  For individuals with AGI below $50,000, the functions were essentially 
the same, but differed for those above this level.  Specifically, above this income level in 
1989, the marginal tax rate increased from 28 to 33 percent due to the phase-out of the 
personal exemption.  However, the Budget Act of 1990 raised the top marginal tax rate to 
31 percent and changed the phase-out of the personal exemption.  Therefore, the non-
linearity in the instruments’ tax function differs from that for the endogenous regressor 
due to the tax-law change, which is taken as exogenous to the individual.   About 15 
percent of the sample is affected by this differential non-linearity in the instruments.   
2 − t
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0 to 24  9  4.3  11  3.0 
25  23 15.3 43 11.6 
26  to  49  5 2.4 9 2.4 
50  90  43.1 143 38.4 
51 to 99  22  8.1  34  12.4 
100  57  27.2 116 31.2 
200  3 1.4 4 1.1 
      
Total  209 100.0 372 100.0 
Note:  Authors’ calculations from the HRS restricted-access pension plan data for the 209 plans associated 
with the 372 of the 1,042 HRS individuals in the analysis sample in plans with matching provisions. 
  Table 2.  Cap on Matching Contributions, as a Percentage of Pay, for  
Plans that Offer Employer Matching in the Analysis Sample 
 
Cap on Employer Matching 
Contributions  















Percent of  
Individuals 
Less than 2%  7  3.3  10  2.7 
2  11 5.3 12 3.2 
2.5  1 0.5 1 0.3 
3  19 9.1 24 6.5 
3.75  1 0.5 4 1.0 
4  23 11.0 40 10.8 
5 17  8.1  53  14.2 
5.5  1 0.5 1 0.3 
5.7  1 0.5 1 0.3 
6  56  26.8 109 29.3 
Greater  than  6%  32 15.3 57 15.3 
No  Cap  41 19.6 60 16.1 
      
Total  209 100.0 372 100.0 
Note:  Authors’ calculations from the HRS restricted-access pension plan data for the 209 plans associated 
with the 372 of the 1,042 HRS individuals in the analysis sample in plans with matching provisions. 
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Table 3.  Sample Means of Selected Variables in the Empirical Analysis Sample,  

















































          















          
After-Tax Wage 
















          















          















          
Percent Female  47  47  47  48  45 
          
Percent White  82  81  85  86  78 
          















          
Percent Married  80  79  82  81  79 


















          
Percent with Plans that 
Allow Borrowing 
36 19  68  42  29 
          
Percent with Plans that 
Allow Hardship 
Withdrawals 
4 4  5  6  2 






























Percent with Plans that 
Allow Self-Directed 
Investment 
63  46 92 66  58 
         
Percent with Other 
Pensions at the Firm  
47  53 34 45  48 
         
Percent with Plan Limit 
less than Federal Limit 
80  73 92 76  85 
         
Percent with Plan that 
Allows After-Tax Saving 
23 9  47 26  18 
         
Percent that had 
Employer-Sponsored 
Retirement Seminar 
23  23 23 25  20 
         
Percent with a Spouse 
who has a Pension 
39  39 38 42  35 
         
Percent in a Union  34  39  27  28  43 
         
Number  of  Observations  1042  670 372 588  454 
Note:  Authors’ calculations based on the sample of 1042 HRS individuals working in 1991 with matched 
employer-provided pension plan data and W-2 data, excluding those in plans with discretionary and profit-sharing-






 Table 4.  Selected Parameter Estimates, Marginal Effects, and  Elasticities from Box-Cox Utility Function,  
Correcting for Selection and Endogeneity, 95 Percent Confidence Intervals in Brackets 
Measure  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
A. Parameter Estimate of λ        








       
 Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution   0.8344  0.7629  0.7978  0.7386 
  [1.01,0.52]  [1.26,0.47] [1.45,0.48] [1.21,0.37] 
       
B. Additional Controls       
       
Fringe Benefit and Plan Characteristics?  No  Yes Yes Yes 
Interaction of Firm Size with Fringe Benefits and Plan Characteristics?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Occupation and Interactions of Occupation with Demographics, Fringe 
Benefits, Plan Characteristics, and Other Employment Characteristics?  No No  No  Yes 
       
C.  Selected Other Parameter Estimates       
11 δ      (Constant)  -4.07  -4.98 -6.33 -5.19 
  [-21.35,7.19]  [-44.01,1.91] [-33.89,5.74] [-35.52,6.30] 
12 δ     (Age)  0.01 0.04  0.04  0.06 
  [-0.13,0.15]  [-0.11,0.23] [-0.23,0.20] [-0.13,0.27] 
13 δ      (Female)  0.04 0.82  0.99  0.78 
  [-0.60,1.47]  [-0.21,4.22] [-0.71,3.84] [-0.72,3.43] 
14 δ      (White)  0.81 0.48  0.36  0.17 
 [-0.51,3.29]  [-0.53,4.94]  [-1.18,4.32]    [-1.46,5.13] 
15 δ      (Married)  0.28 0.61  0.83  0.64 
  [-1.70,1.77]  [-0.96,2.50] [-0.47,4.24] [-1.02,3.03] 
16 δ      (Education)  0.34 0.20  0.30  0.13 
  [0.02,1.01] [0.01,1.71]  [0.008,1.68] [-0.012,1.33] 
2 δ       (κ )  0.04  -0.17 -0.12 -0.37 
  [-1.38,1.31]  [-1.83,0.85] [-1.84,1.15] [-2.04,1.40] 
       
D. Marginal Effect on the Probability of Participation with Respect to the       
        
  39Match  Rate  0.0706  0.0885 0.1150 0.1499 
       
Full  Income  -0.0106  -0.0074 -0.0125 -0.0081 
       
Net  Wage  -0.0003  -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 
       
Marginal Tax Rate  0.0287  0.0182  0.0307  0.0197 
       
Predicted Probability of Participation  0.94  0.86  0.85  0.77 
       
E. Parameter Estimates for Selection Term and Exclusion Restrictions in the Selection Equation 
       
Selection Term   -0.63  -0.63  -0.48  -0.35 
  [-1.38,0.14]  [-1.30,0.04] [-1.49,0.13] [-1.06,0.58] 
Selection-Equation  Exclusions:       
Plan Administration Outsourcing  -0.38  -0.37  -0.44  -0.49 
     (0.10)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Plan  Consolidation  -0.58  -0.63 -0.73 -0.76 
  (0.15)  (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Left Job Due to Business Closure  -0.16  -0.13  -0.15  -0.16 
       (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Left Job Because Laid Off 0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.02 
  (0.08)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Note: Columns 1-4 of Panel A of this table present selected parameter estimates from (17) in the text estimating λ  using non-linear maximum likelihood.  For all 
columns, the sample consists of 1,042 individuals.  All the columns assume prices, net wage, and virtual income are endogenous, and correct for endogeneity 
using the instrumental variables discussed in the text.  All columns correct for possible non-random selection into the sample using the exclusion restrictions 
discussed in the text.  Bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals have been reported in square brackets for parameters estimated by nonlinear maximum 
likelihood, e.g., λ and the EIS, to account for the two-step nature of estimation to correct for endogeneity and selection.  Marginal effects evaluated at the mean 
of the regressors are shown in panel D are based on the parameter estimates in panel A, evaluated at the sample means. For the selection equation in panel E, 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Panel B presents the additional controls included. 
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